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 
Abstract— The aim of this paper is to reformulate the question of 
school choice in a voucher system, by moving towards a 
perspective, assessing competition between schools and the 
choice of students using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
and Agent-Based Modeling (ABM). How spatial structure affects 
competition among schools? How do socio-geographic 
structuration and social interaction affect this process? We show 
a preview of the proposed model and main social mechanisms of 
school choice: Quality, Distance, Cost, Expectations, Homophily 
and Mimesis for students and their families, and Selection, 
Supply and Local Competition for schools. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper aims reformulate the question of school choice 
within the Chilean educational system, moving towards 
assessing the levels of competition among schools and the freedom 
of choice of students and families using Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) and Agent Based Modeling (ABM). The school 
choice voucher system that operates in Chile is one of the most 
studied research topics in Chilean education. It was created to 
maximize competition between schools in favor of increasing the 
quality and coverage of education in Chile. Evidence about the 
success of the system to fulfill its objectives is inconclusive, and 
studies including geographical factors are scarce. Most of the 
researches are based on variations of regression models trying to 
link school choice to educational quality. There have been no 
attempts to approach this issue though ABM, nor from complex 
geographic methodologies nor from the perspective of analytical 
sociology. Using the available databases for the city of Santiago, it 
is possible to geo-reference families’ position in relation to the; 
position of the schools to assess the distance between them and by 
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using GIS, it is possible to identify other socio-spatial conditions 
that affect school choice processes. ABM can be developed to 
simulate the behavior of families and schools, and the distance 
effects on variables of educational interest. It is relevant that future 
researches address the study of the effects of the spatial structure on 
the level of competition among schools, and how this structure 
affects the quality of education. The ABM may be calibrated with 
empirical geographic, socioeconomic and educational data, to 
simulate the manner in which families and educational institutions 
behave in relation to the conditions of their spatial environment. 
This could allow the generation of simulations of future behavior 
of the educational system if current conditions are maintained and 
could help social scientists and policy-makers to project 
counterfactual policy scenarios by the way of simulation, in order 
to compare different alternatives for the current system. Then, by 
reconstructing the question of school choice in Chile, new 
questions emerge, as the following: How does the spatial 
structuring affects competition between schools? Do agents make 
choices in constrained or full freedoms and rationality? Are agents 
pushed or pulled by the educational offer and socio-geographic 
structure? To what extent this spatial structuring as a context of 
operation of a voucher system is efficient and improves quality, in 
comparison with alternative systems? What would be the effects of 
changes in public policy regarding school choice? To what extent 
the existence of a school choice system and a voucher financing 
system favors improvement or decline quality of education in 
Chile? Future research with ABM and GIS offer an innovative 
alternative to assess theoretical, methodological and practical 
questions on school choice in Chile and in other choice based 
systems around the world. We show a preview of the proposed 
model and main social mechanisms of school choice: Quality, 
Distance, Cost, Expectations, Homophily and Mimesis for students 
and their families, and Selection, Supply and Local Competition for 
schools. 
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II. TOWARDS A GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT-BASED MODEL OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE IN CHILE 
The choice process in the field of education is complex and 
multidimensional. It has attracted the interest of sociologists, 
psychologists and economists, who have approached the 
subject from different points of view [1]. In addition, there 
are several school attendance policy models operating in 
different countries and contexts, and one of them is the 
model of free choice −Enforced regulatory zoning model 
(France, Germany); unforced regulatory zoning model 
(Finland, Norway, Scotland); restricted choice model (Spain, 
Italy or Sweden) and choice model (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, England and Wales), 
according [2] − The current Chilean system –since the 
massive implementation of the demand subsidy mechanism 
through school vouchers in primary and secondary 
education– constitutes a unique scenario in the global 
context to assess the school choice process. It follows strong 
abstract assumptions and criteria: by means of maximizing of 
the freedom of choice of the families, the system would 
supposedly lead to increased competition within schools to 
capture as many students as they can [3]. Competition among 
schools will finally derive in increasing quality, as lower 
performance schools would tend to disappear. From this 
point of view, competition among schools would occur by 
increasing the quality of the education provided [4]), which 
can be distinguished by student’s families. 
 
This educational funding model based on demand subsidies 
(vouchers) offers a privileged observation context of the 
school choice process, motivating national and international 
research based on the Chilean case [5] Due to the social 
relevance of the matter, most researches combine the 
academic discussion of choice processes with public policy 
recommendations [6] Some authors, in favor of a voucher 
system, argue that it increases efficiency, competiveness and 
quality of education, while providing greater educational 
opportunities to disadvantaged students [7], [8], [9]. Critics 
of the voucher system claim that the school choice based in 
vouchers increases inequality, segregation and educational 
stratification. Others argue that the optimal competition 
conditions that the model intends cannot be met because of 
market flaws [10] The sociological problem beneath these 
questions is related to freedom of choice, and how it can be 
complete, limited or even possible, in diverse social contexts 
[11] It is also related to Diego Gambetta’s question: “Were 
they pushed or did they jump?” [12] structural constrains 
and incentives may be exerting influence on school choices. 
 
On one hand, neoliberal economic theory –focused in the 
freedom of choice of the individual– assumes the generation 
of optimal market competition conditions by means of 
aggregated individual rational decisions intended to 
maximize benefits. On the other hand, classic sociological 
theories highlight the importance of structural factors that 
motivate, alter, distort, orient or inhibit behavior on 
individuals, while the individuals can modify their own 
position within the structure or even have influence over the 
structure [13], [14], [15], [16]. The analytical sociology 
perspective of this paper assumes that although the 
individual has some freedom to choose, this choices always 
take place in empirically situated contexts, where several 
structural factors and the interaction with others may limit 
choice in its pure and exclusively rational form. The process 
of choice will be addressed from the perspective of what has 
been termed “real freedom” [17] which supposes that 
individuals make decisions based on limited relevant or 
identifiable options within his or her context. 
 
Empirical data on reasons for school choice put into 
perspective the theoretical arguments in which voucher 
systems are based. Table 1 shows that the reason most 
mentioned establishment choice criterion by parents is not 
the academic quality results (only 31%), measured by the 
standardized tests, SIMCE for primary and secondary 
education and PSU for college entry, but the proximity to the 
family home (52%). 
 
In addition, the mention of the shortest distance as the 
reason of choice is more common (65%) in the first two 
income quintiles, corresponding to the poorest 40% of the 
population. By contrast, the academic quality is mentioned 
as a reason for choosing more frequently in the richest 
families in the country (41% and 49% in quintiles IV and V).  
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There is evidence that the process of choice, therefore, is 
configured socioeconomically; [18], [19], [20]. In this 
regard, the study conducted in [21] stands out, as it 
recognizes three types of parents regarding their ability to 
operate in the "education market": parents that are 
"competent", with high cultural capital and information to 
choose school depending on the quality; parents that are 
"semi-competent" to choose using the reputation of the 
school as reference to opt; and finally, "disconnected" 
parents, who choose according to the closeness. In Chile, 
according to the SIMCE 2009 survey results, "disconnected" 
parents seem to predominate, especially in the poorest (Table 
1). 
 
Methodologically, the effects of the voucher system have 
been addressed from two perspectives: the perspective of 
verbalization or declaration (by means of qualitative or 
quantitative research) of reasons for choice which is 
generally limited to the description, and another perspective 
of ex post facto analysis of school choices. From the latter 
perspective, economic studies using statistical methods and 
econometric models have been conducted to assess effects of 
the system in quality [22], [23], [24]. To the date, no 
conclusive results have been brought up regarding the impact 
of the school choice process on quality. Such investigations 
tend to emphasize the effects of the voucher system in 
academic results, regardless of the spatio-temporal structure 
that relates to the position, distance and other conditions 
affecting elections of families in socio-geographic contexts. 
Contrarily, national [25] and international [26] evidence 
have been gathered supporting the hypothesis that school 
choice policies tend to affect negatively the equality of 
education. The OECD alerts about the risks: “School choice 
has increased across OECD countries. Yet, it can result in 
segregating students by ability, income and ethnic 
background and in greater inequities across education 
systems. School choice schemes should include mechanisms 
that mitigate the negative effects on equity” [27]. 
Only few authors have proceeded through geo-referencing 
methodology, GIS and distance analysis to observe school 
choice processes and to assess the role of quality in this 
choice, both internationally [28], [29] and nationally [30], 
[31], [32]. However, these researches do not consider the 
interaction among educational stakeholders –between 
students/families and schools and among schools– in 
different conditions, according to specific geographical 
contexts and distribution of educational agents. Therefore, 
they cannot conclusively determine the validity of the 
assumption of choice and competition in the system, as 
social and spatial interaction has not been considered. 
 
The great amount of individuals and groups involved, the 
complex interaction networks and different levels of 
aggregation in the educational sphere have led some authors 
to describe the field of education as a complex system [33], 
[34], to the extent that it is recursive, self-referential, self-
regulates its operation and from which emergent properties 
arise from the interaction of agents and their different 
relation between them [35]. In this kind of systems, it is not 
possible to predict with absolute precision the evolution and 
changes they will experience, as complex networks of 
interaction aggregate to shape its conditions [36], [37], [38], 
[39]. Therefore, the authors who are observing the systems 
from the complexity perspective note that there are specific 
tools to address them, which have been called the 
“complexity algorithms” [40]. In particular, the ABM seem 
best suited to observe social systems as complex local 
interactions networks [41], [42], [43]. ABM has been 
recently used to assess educational choice in France and Italy 
[44]. This work offers an ABM of educational choice, in 
which agents make decisions regarding going up another 
year of education. Another paper [45] is highly relevant, as 
offers a revisiting of Schelling’s model applied to school 
dynamics. The main mechanisms presented in that paper is 
the preference for shorter distance and the preference for 
TABLE I – PERCENTAGE OF PARENTS WHO MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR SCHOOL CHOICE  
AMONG THE TOP THREE CHOICES. SOURCE: SIMCE SURVEY 2009. 
  
     
Reasons for school choice Total I II III IV V 
Because it is close the family home 52% 65% 65% 62% 59% 50% 
Because it offers high quality of education (SIMCE and PSU)  31% 25% 31% 37% 41% 49% 
Because of their values and orientation 29% 23% 28% 32% 38% 47% 
Because of its infrastructure 23% 18% 22% 26% 31% 36% 
Because brothers attend this school 2% 29% 29% 26% 23% 21% 
Because it was the cheapest one 21% 34% 32% 27% 21% 12% 
Because friends attend this school 10% 12% 12% 12% 11% 10% 
Because it was bilingual 5% 2% 3% 3% 4% 10% 
Because it was the only one on the district 4% 7% 6% 4% 4% 3% 
Because it offered the vocational course that looked for 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Because my son/daughter was not accepted in other school 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
Other Reason 26% 25% 29% 31% 33% 33% 
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similar ethnicity; however, although highly relevant, this 
works do not offer data calibration for their models. 
Finally, the voucher system has been challenged from 
different theoretical, methodological and policy perspectives, 
evaluating their effectiveness, usefulness and validity of 
basal assumptions through diverse methods. Therefore, the 
theoretical question of how social conditions and the spatial 
setting affect the choice process emerges. It is also relevant 
from a policy-maker perspective to ask what effect this 
school choice policy (vouchers) has on the overall quality of 
the educational system. On the other hand, it is 
methodologically relevant to address the question of how to 
approach the social phenomenon of school choice in this 
context, as it seems necessary to move forward in applying 
innovative methodologies to allow a more comprehensive 
view of the process of choosing schools. 
 
III. NATIONAL CONTEXT: VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL CHOICE IN 
CHILE 
In Chile, since the educational reform of 1981, the school 
education funding scheme operates through a demand-based 
subsidy mechanism, commonly referred to as voucher or 
coupon, which means that the State pays monthly to the 
school private owners or public responsible institutions or 
individuals, conditional to effective attendance of students 
averaged over the last three months prior to payment. This 
mechanism is intended to provide greater choice for families, 
promote competition for the attraction and retention of 
pupils amongst schools, resulting in improved levels of 
educational quality. The amount of the school subsidy was 
established by law, which have been slightly modified 
applying some minor changes during the last three decades, 
as the subsidy amount has increased and it now differs by 
education level and modality of education, and there are 
bonuses for the subsidy if the school is in a rural area, if it is 
in a geographically isolated area, amongst other bonuses 
(DFL N º 2, Ministry of Education, 1996, called "Subsidies 
Act").  
The reform of the early '80s was based on the theoretical 
proposal of Milton Friedman [46] which held the 
convenience of installing a predominantly private system of 
educational provision based on market mechanisms, 
reducing the role of the State [47]. Although school choice in 
Chile has always been the student allocation policy, it is very 
important to note that the law that created the voucher 
system was passed during the military dictatorship and it was 
not subject of democratic discussion. After 1990, with the 
return of democracy, the demand-based scheme has been 
deepened, corrected and consolidated. The main changes of 
the system were that the government partially funds general 
education and requires a minimal curriculum, leaving the 
administration of schools in the hands of competing 
companies. The State delivers a payment to the schools that 
are selected by the families, assuming that it maximizes their 
capabilities of choice. The voucher was assumed as a system 
which would create a virtuous competition amongst schools. 
Since the implementation of the voucher model, the Chilean 
education has significantly increased enrollment and 
coverage [48] and recently, performance has slightly 
improved in some international measurement results [49], 
although there is no evidence that the voucher system has 
been the one and only cause of this growth. However, gaps 
remain in the performance indicators of schools from 
different income levels [50], an issue that has given place to 
many studies which have tried to explain this phenomenon. 
Most of them have been looking at the effects of the 
demand-based subsidy model [51]. 
 
Supporters of the voucher system argue that maximized 
the choice of families, educational institutions will compete 
to attract students and increase enrollment. Gradually, this 
design would eliminate the schools that fail to attract 
students, while increasing the range of options, so that the 
system would enjoy the benefits of market competition. 
Supporters of this model tend to emphasize the benefits of 
competition in a context of free choice, which would lead to 
improved quality, while opponents point to the inequity of 
the system and the lack of evidence for the quality 
improvement. The voucher system has been subject of 
extensive discussion in academic, political and ideological 
spheres, being highly relevant to Chile. Recently, the 2011 
student movement pointed-out the flaws and inequalities of 
Chilean education, in which the demand subsidy was highly 
criticized. From this perspective, it is very important to 
account for the effectiveness and usefulness of the voucher 
as funding model, which would allow scientists to establish 
technical criteria for the policy development of the 
educational system, better satisfying social demands for 
quality and equity in education. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: RESEARCH ON VOUCHERS AND 
SCHOOL CHOICE IN CHILE 
Some authors have argued that the voucher system in a 
model of educational choice would lead to an improvement 
in the quality of education [52], [53] because the only way 
that a school have to attract students and increase and retain 
enrollment is quality of education. 
The introduction of the voucher system has also raised a 
number of criticisms, as we have seen. [54] and  [55] suggest 
that the demand subsidy mechanism necessarily generates 
inequality. Other authors argue that there are market failures 
that prevent the optimal results expected of competition [56]. 
Although some researchers claim that the voucher system 
improves the quality of education by maximizing the 
freedom of families [57] other authors discuss these results, 
arguing that there are profound socioeconomic and 
information differences, which lead to increasing inequality 
and segregation [58],  [59], [60]. 
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In the national and international literature, so far, there is 
no consensus about the effectiveness of the system of 
subsidizing demand and school choice mechanisms, mainly 
because there is no conclusive research on the actual 
conditions of freedom of choice ("real choice"). For 
example, [61], [62] argue that introducing the income level 
and parental education as control variables, no significant 
differences between the quality of public and subsidized can 
be observed. Previous research have not yet found a clear 
answer regarding the usefulness or not of vouchers on 
improving quality, as suggested by [63], [64] and [65] 
among others. These studies apply statistical controls to the 
process of self-selection of families when they choose 
school. However, these studies do not include the distance 
amongst the factors that influence choice, even though it 
appears to be an extremely relevant variable as it was shown 
in Table 1. 
Regarding the inclusion of distance in the selection 
process, in the international literature the work of Hastings, 
[66] stands out: They find that the distance and school 
performance on standardized tests are increasingly important 
for parents and families with higher income level and 
students with stronger cognitive abilities. [67] conclude that 
the differences in information levels are highly relevant in 
the process of choosing school. 
In Chile there have been few studies in which students' 
homes are geo-referenced or that include geographical 
variables regarding students and their schools. [68] and also  
[69] provide some examples. They attempt to approach the 
matter of the distance between the households and the 
schools that students attend, calculating travel distances for 
each student. A more recent study [70], geo-referenced the 
students who took the PSU (College Entry Test) in 2009, in 
order to evaluate the school selection process that took place. 
The authors postulate that households make different 
decision processes, including a first choice among schools 
(distinguishing excellent performance schools from others), 
and then choose between schools closer to home. In addition, 
the authors found that families are willing to set aside 7 PSU 
points, to travel one less kilometer. 
However, the agents in the system do not make 
educational choices in a homogeneous or neutral 
environment. Considering the geographical and 
demographical distribution of the educational suppliers and 
demanders, different conditions of choice can be found, 
involving diverse competition schemes between schools. 
Some authors have termed this situation as “quasi-markets” 
in education [71]. These conditions can generate a scenario 
of what we can call a "geo-competitive isolation" of certain 
schools, due to the differentiated social, economic, cultural 
conditions of their environment. These geo-isolated schools 
do not have the same incentives to improve that other 
schools, because they are under different competitiveness 
conditions. This situation may contradict the principles of 
perfect competition in which the voucher and school choice 
systems are based. It is for this reason that the methodology 
of geo-referencing to approach school choice [72] must 
become more complex to allow the approach of 
transportation phenomena or differentiated urban spaces that 
generate changes in agents' decisions. This implies to go 
beyond the measurement of travel distances, and address 
connectivity, security, levels of trust, social cohesion, 
availability of options to choose, and several other variables 
that can be affected by geographic location. 
Similarly, the mere application of statistical correlations to 
geographic phenomena does not solve the problem of local 
interaction nor allows social scientists to simulate alternative 
scenarios to test hypotheses. That is innovative 
methodologies are required to account for the complexity of 
the school choice process in this voucher scheme of 
educational choice. The complex social systems perspective 
offers several tools for its analysis [73], as cellular automata 
[74], [75] and agent-based modeling and social simulation 
[76], [77], [78]. These modeling techniques are theoretically 
related with the analytical sociology perspective [79], [80], 
[81], etc.).  
We have developed this subject for the last 4 years in the 
Institute of Philosophy and Complexity Sciences (IFICC), 
getting involved on methodologies of agent-based modeling 
[82]. Currently, it is relevant to explore the possibility of 
using agent-based models and GIS to assess school choice  
[83], [84], [85]. The models can be calibrated with real data 
available, which indicate academic performance, 
socioeconomic conditions, demographic data, location of 
facilities, etc., provided by the Chilean Ministry of 
Education. Therefore, from the perspective of geo-
referenced modeling of local interaction of agents which 
understands education as a complex system, it is relevant to 
try to respond about the influence of social and geographical 
heterogeneity in school choice processes, particularly in the 
current educational voucher system in Chile. Agent-based 
modeling techniques calibrated with geo-referenced data can 
aid in generating predictions and project simulated 
counterfactual scenarios [86], [87]. 
 
V. THEORETICAL CONTEXT: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE WITHIN 
SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
The concept of education as a competitive market is the 
basis of the theory of Milton Friedman [88], who proposed a 
model of educational provision based on freedom of choice 
for families, in which the state subsidizes the attendance of 
children of the schools of their choice through a voucher. As 
schools compete for students in this market, the individual 
incentive of schools is on improving the quality, which 
enables an overall system optimization. In a related line of 
thought, but with a more theoretically complex approach, 
authors like Coleman [89] Hedström [90] and Elster [91] 
analyze the relationship between freedom of choice and 
individual rational choice. The seminal work of Boudon [92] 
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[93], [94] shed lights in the link between social structure and 
school choice, opening the door for limited rationality or 
different rational approach in diverse socioeconomic 
contexts, with his concept of “primary” and “secondary” 
effects of culture and class, respectively. Boudon’s work is 
also very interesting as he proposed changes to the 
educational system in order to reduce segregation, which is 
crucial in the approach of the Chilean voucher system of 
school public funding.  
From the more structural sociological theory (not 
structuralism as [95] warned), individual rational choice is 
put into perspective within an analysis of the structure-agent 
relationship, meaning that the organization of social space 
and time is understood as dynamic relationship of 
interdependence between agent and structure. In this line of 
thought, the social structure determines into a certain extent 
the action of the agents so they would not act in a fully 
"rational" manner, while the projects and actions of the 
agents may also lead to structural changes [96], [97], [98]. 
The choice of educational establishment, in this sense, can 
be understood as a dynamic process in which combine 
structural and individual actions to shape social reality. In 
this regard, this research assumes the theoretical question the 
extent in which agent and structure determines each other. In 
the matter of school choice, it intends to reveal if they “were 
pushed” into selecting certain school or if they “jumped” by 
themselves to enroll in it, or if it is a little bit of both 
mechanisms [99]. 
One of the most interesting approaches to the problem of 
this research is the Theory of Real Freedom. In general, we 
refer to the concept of educational opportunities to all those 
possibilities that are available for opting in education, which 
together with not being prohibited are feasible to afford in 
terms of resources. In this sense, the notion of increasing 
educational opportunities relates to the concept of real 
freedom provided by the Belgian philosopher Philippe Van 
Parijs [100]. Under this concept, real freedom conjuncts in 
one instances the negative dimension of the concept of 
freedom (“no one can stop me from exerting my will”) with 
the positive idea of having the resources and capabilities to 
do it. In this sense, the concept of "real freedom" of Van 
Parijs is more demanding than that of negative freedom, as it 
interrogates for the effective availability of resources (of 
various kinds) to execute the will of the individual [101]). 
Due to the above, in the context of this research, the 
question addresses the real possibilities beyond the merely 
virtual ones, from which people may choose. In this case, it 
is relevant to assess the possibilities of action of parents, in 
regard of the selection of the educational institution where 
their children will attend. This means asking for the 
educational opportunities, involving the combination of no 
prohibition with effective resource allocation to do so. This 
notion of opportunity applied to education, is clearly 
connected with the notion of opportunity presented in the 
DBO model (Desires, Beliefs & Opportunities) proposed by 
[102]). Under this model, although opportunities may exist 
independently of the actor, they must be known, so that they 
can affect the actor’s behavior through their beliefs. This 
phenomenon adds an additional element, subtle but 
important for the present analysis: it calls into question that 
if those educational opportunities are not prohibited and are 
affordable in terms of resources, the actors should be fully 
aware of their real feasibility. 
 
In referring to the DBO model, it must also be considered 
that the action of an actor affects the opportunities of other 
actors, too. This shows the importance of the interaction 
between agents in a complex system of relationships, which 
determines the conditions of real freedom of the agents of 
the system: A desire or belief of an agent can affect its 
perception of opportunity, and an observing agent may shift 
his desires or beliefs because of this action, allowing new 
opportunities to emerge for that agent. Agent-based 
modeling seems to be one of the few formal tools for coping 
with this issue [103]. Under these conditions, a reformulation 
of the sociological research question in rather manner is 
required, as conditions of real freedom for educational 
choice must now be addressed in socio-spatially located 
contexts.  
 
VI. PROPOSED SCHOOL CHOICE MECHANISMS FOR A 
VOUCHER-BASED EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM  
The results of background research and statistical analysis of 
socio-economical, educational conditions and geographical 
information, a restructuration of the question regarding 
school choice –in order to construct a model– requires the 
identification of some fundamental elements: a) 
Environmental conditions; b) Agent characteristics; c) Rules 
of behavior. But previous to define those model-related 
issues, a sociological analysis should identify the 
mechanisms behind the model’s operational conditions. 
Regarding the environmental conditions, we have 
constructed a quantitative taxonomy of districts in the city of 
Santiago, using several socioeconomic, local, cultural, 
developmental and educational variables. We resumed the 
information of the 33 districts of the Chilean Capital City 
into 7 different groups of districts in which conditions for 
school choice vary. Methodologically, the taxonomy of 
districts comes from a factor analysis of principal 
components, with varimax rotation (on appendix).  
 
From over 200 social and educational indicators from 
several governmental datasets, from which 20 relevant index 
were constructed. Six factor explain 63% of total variance, 
and helped us to construct groups of districts. Details in the 
factor and cluster analysis may be found in [104].  
 
The factors were denominated according to the kind of 
phenomena that variables were related to: (1) “Distrital local 
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development” (including security, public school conditions, 
local entrepreneurship, health services quality and municipal 
finances). (2) “Economic and cultural capital” (ownership of 
means of transportation, socioeconomic level, quality of 
dwellings, educational level). (3) “Secondary socialization 
an integration” (including access to information, school life). 
(4) “Power” (including labor scale position and daily need to 
travel). (5) “Health and growth of housing” (including 
growth of housing and municipal health) and (6) “Local 
uprooting” (including housing mobility, civic culture and 
ethnicity). 
 
Then, we applied a cluster analysis, which grouped districts 
according to the factors. Interpreting the dendrogram (on 
appendix), seven types of districts emerged, with 
differentiated conditions for school choice. Great 
environmental differences –that may be affecting school 
choice conditions– emerge with the analysis, showing great 
geographic diversity in terms of opportunities for families. 
More and better choice conditions concentrate in the wealthy 
eastern zone of Santiago. Great and new residential districts 
with high growth in the last years (in red) configure a reality 
of its own. Concentric distribution of school choice 
conditions, from the central Santiago district to the more 
peripheral districts. An interesting relation occurs regarding 
the concentration of better social conditions with availability 
of the subway and the encirclement highway (with involves 
all orange districts).        
We resumed the information of the 33 districts of the 
Chilean Capital City into 7 different groups of districts in 
which conditions for school choice vary:  
 
Agents, therefore, will have diverse contexts for choosing 
school depending on their location in the city, which offer a 
differentiated structure of opportunities for choice. 
To build the proposed model it is necessary to identify the 
main social mechanisms of school choice. Statistical and 
theoretical research led the team to reduce the complexity of 
school choice to six different mechanisms for students and 
their families: Preference for quality, Preference for shorter 
distance, Preference for lower costs, Differences in 
expectations for different agents, Homophily in terms of 
socioeconomic similarity and Mimesis of neighbors 
behavior. Preliminary evidence on Chile suggest that 
distance, quality and price are the most relevant determinants 
of school choice [105].  
We also preliminary present three main mechanisms to 
explain school behavior: Selection, Supply and Local 
Competition.   
 
• Preference for higher quality is a relevant concept both 
theoretically and empirically, as parents tend to choose 
schools that show better performance. Choice system’s 
advocates defend the importance of quality as a signal for the 
choosing families, as an ideal school system will lead most 
families to choose better schools and the rest would simply 
disappear (although this have been contested by evidence). 
Still quality is frequently used as a choice mechanism, but 
the relative importance that different kinds of actors give to 
quality to make decisions vary greatly among socioeconomic 
 
Figure 1– Typology of districts of Santiago, Chile, varying school choice conditions. Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
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and educational backgrounds. The social mechanism 
expressed in its more general way is the   following: “Parents 
prefer higher quality schools”. Although the “level of quality 
of a school” is still a social construction, there is multiple 
evidence that parents tend to prefer schools that they view as 
higher quality schools for their children [106].      
 
• Preference for shorter distance is the most general 
geographic condition affecting school choice. Although 
usually neglected, distance has been included solely as 
Euclidian distance, thus not considering other issues as 
connectivity, geographical obstacles and availability of 
transportation, which varies in different socioeconomic, 
cultural and educational contexts. In this preliminary 
research, the social mechanism of distance may be expressed 
as: “Parents prefer schools which are close to their homes”, 
and the strength of that preference is diverse according to the 
context and agents’ conditions. Preference for shorter 
distance appears frequently in the literature, both for Chile 
[107] and internationally [108], so it is reasonable to use this 
mechanism in our model. 
 
• Preference for lower price is the third mechanism. The 
financial aspect in a voucher system with the possibility of 
complementing the schooling cost beyond of what is covered 
by the voucher implies a form of segregation by payment 
capacities. Poorer parents will not be able to access to some 
schools, in which tuitions cost are higher. There is abundant 
evidence that in poorer backgrounds the preference for low 
cost is overwhelmingly high and even at some levels, paid 
schools are simply out of the choice set [109]. On the other 
hand, for richer parents, a more expensive school may signal 
quality or separation from other social groups, so tuition 
levels may act attracting high income families. This cost 
effect varies among different socioeconomic levels. 
Therefore, the social mechanisms can be simplified to the 
following: “Parents tend to choose schools with lower tuition 
costs”, but the intense of the preference varies as some 
parents may afford higher tuition fees and may interpret them 
as quality indicators. This calls for a deeper discussion that 
will not be address here, but we acknowledge it, for it to be 
included in further versions of the model, once a first version 
is concluded.  
 
• Expectations play a major role in school choice, as 
higher expected results may lead to higher investments from 
parents, while the need for an immediate income may lead 
poorer families to prefer a vocational, work-oriented and 
shorter educational track. This implies that the rule should be 
“Parents with lower expectations of educational continuity 
may select vocational tracks, while parents with higher 
educational perspectives tend to choose scientific and 
humanistic tracks”, which intensities’ varies across social 
groups. Expectations are included in [110] and [111]. 
 
• Homophily is a long identifiable social mechanism for 
several kinds of choice. In this proposal, homophily is 
regarded as the tendency to choose schools in which student 
with similar characteristics attend. Therefore, the mechanism 
in this case is “Parents choose schools in which students that 
are similar to them attend”, which relative importance is 
different depending on other variables. Homophily is a 
traditionally used variable to explain social behavior [112], 
and there is evidence of homophilic behavior in educational 
contexts [113], [114]. Much of the literature in this regard 
approaches the issue of race and ethnicity, which is not 
relevant to Chile. Therefore, the socioeconomic background 
may operate in the same way that racial variable does, as 
reported in US schools.  
 
• The final concept is mimesis, theoretically and 
empirically proved mechanism for decision making and 
behavior in social conditions. Imitating other people 
behavior is probably the most basic behavior scheme in 
social contexts, and no difference is expected in educational 
choice situations. The rule can be formalized as “Parents 
choose schools that other parents of their local neighborhood 
do”. Imitative behavior is also a widely used mechanism to 
explain social phenomena. Reference [115] reports that 
imitative behavior may foster a growing tendency to 
inequality, which may be applied to educational choice. 
Reference [116] includes the variable of social interaction 
between members of different groups, which may allow 
some kind of inter-group mimesis.  
 
School behavior, although much more limited (as school 
play a mostly passive role trying to attract students), still is 
important to model school choice. Therefore, we had 
identified three main mechanisms that we can summarize on:  
• If possible, Schools will select student with better initial 
conditions, as education costs an efforts will be smaller if 
children and teenagers already have higher social and 
cultural capital. Selection has two versions: a) Academic 
version: “Schools tend to select higher performing students” 
and b) Economic version: “Schools tend to select higher 
income students”. These mechanism present variations 
across diverse social groups and varies by levels of demand 
for educational services. 
• Preference for limited relative educational supply: 
Where School is located will define much of it ability to 
attract and capture student enrollment. They choose 
according to several variables: “Schools tend to prefer 
locations in search of increased profit, increased enrollment, 
and lower investment”, varying by school type.  
• Schools will reduce levels of effort in improving 
education in contexts of lower local competition:  This 
relates directly to geocompetitive isolation, market share and 
market power. This mechanism implies an increase on the 
levels of freedom for school with less competition around.  
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Although several other mechanisms may be identified, this 
research shows the basic geographical contextual structural 
factors and the main social mechanisms for choice, as well as 
the reasons for them to vary across groups. This approach 
will serve as theoretical and empirical background for the 
construction and programming of a school choice model for 
simulating the evolution and effects of diverse choice 
conditions, first in Chile, but then in other contexts in which 
voucher policies and school choice mechanisms are relevant 
configurators of the educational system.  
 
VII. TOWARDS A “ZERO” MODEL OF SCHOOL CHOICE FOR 
SANTIAGO, CHILE 
Although this is a preliminary work, some light can be 
shed on how a model could be constructed, with the 
available variables and data. 
As stated before, the model feeds on real data regarding the 
position of each school in Santiago. In the first set of images, 
we present the distribution of schools in Santiago, according 
to their dependence: (1) District (municipal) public schools; 
(2) Private subsidized school and (3) private schools. It is 
evident how public schools are evenly distributed in the city, 
as are the private subsidized schools. To these kinds of 
schools mostly poor and lower middle class attends. In the 
third image, private schools tend to be on the eastern part of 
the city. 
 
The blue curves represent levels of density of schools, and 
the closer they are, the more density they indicate. To these 
schools student go daily, travelling nearly 1 km to their 
school, as showed in the following distribution of travel 
distances to school: 
 
Based on these georeferenced data, the preliminary model 
include two kind of agents: families and schools. The 
operation rules with which agents act depend on three 
mechanisms: the evaluation of distance, the evaluation of 
quality and the evaluation of price (for all of which data and 
other evidence suggest that are relevant variables for school 
choice process). As this is a preliminary attempt, other 
mechanisms that may be relevant were excluded for the 
moment, in hope of including them in more sophisticated 
versions of the model. 
Each variable is calculated from each family regarding all 
schools of the city. After the decision-making process, the 
output of the agent-family is –as a behavior– the selection of 
a given school among all included in the choice set. In the 
simplest model, the choice set is comprised of all schools in 
the city.  
For agent-schools, behavior rules depend of two kind of 
variables: the number of families that chose the school and 
the student’s academic performance. The output of the agent-
school performance as a behavior is a change of price and 
school quality (standardized test performance). The positions 
of families and schools are real positions reported in the 
geographical coordinated of the databases, included in the 
GIS. Each iteration of the model represent one academic 
year.  
 
VIII. PSEUDO-CODING OF THE ZERO MODEL 
 
Agent-Family Rules of Behavior 
a. A random family is selected randomly among the 
georeferenced ones (Ai). If the family has already 
chose a school for their children, another family is 
selected randomly.  
 
 
 
     (1) District (municipal) public schools; (2) Private subsidized school      (3) private schools 
 
Figure 2– Schools distribution by type 
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b. A school is selected among the georeferenced ones 
(Cj). If a school has completed their available 
vacancies, another school is randomly selected. 
School vacancies are calculated as the real 
enrolment plus 5%, as basal flexibility.  
c. The distance between Ai y Cj (dij) is calculated and 
the quality value (qj) and price (cj) of the school are 
assigned using the database information. These 
values are normalized. 
d. An utility function for each school is calculated for 
each family U(Ai,Cj) from the values calculated in 
(c). The utility function is equivalent to the sum of 
the partial utility function of each variable (which 
are considered independent by hypothesis) 
U(Ai,Cj)= U(dij)+U(qj)+U(cj). The utility function 
is logistic.  
e. A probability of choice P(Ai,Cj) for Ai to choose Cj 
in a logit model []Benenson and Torrens 2004) in 
the form of P(Ai,Cj)= exp[βU(Ai,Cj)]. 
f. A random number between 0 and 1 is determined. If 
the value is the less or equal to P(Ai,Cj) the family 
Ai chooses the Cj school and the model goes back to 
(a). If the value exceeds P(Ai,Cj) the family Ai does 
not choose Cj school and the model goes back to 
(b). 
g. This part of the model ends when all families have 
selected a school for their children. 
  
Agent-School Rules of Behavior 
h. Once the previous process is finished (all families 
chose schools). The changes of states of schools are 
calculated. 
i. The price of school cj is updated in the following 
year according to the following rule: if vacancies 
are not filled, the price of school updates as cj-∆j, if 
vacancies are indeed filled, the price is updated as 
cj+∆j, where ∆j follows a normal distribution N(x,ε). 
j. Quality qj (in SIMCE standardized test results) is 
updated each year as the average SIMCE average of 
the students of the school.  
k. The simulation ends when all schools have updated 
their states. 
l. The process from (a) is repeated for a Y% of 
randomly selected students. As at least 25% of 
students a year change schools (Y% > 25%). 
This pseudo-coding will be programmed in the R 
environment, using the GIS data of schools and families. 
Future versions of the model will include the taxonomy of 
districts as choice determinants and the other mechanisms 
that have been identified as relevant for social choice 
processes.   
 
IX. THE NEW QUESTION OF SCHOOL CHOICE IN CHILE 
Finally, the school choice process in the current educational 
voucher system in Chile, put against the contextual, 
empirical, conceptual and methodological background, must 
go beyond the question of the utility of the voucher system, 
but it must also encompass the question for the conditions of 
real freedom of educational choice for families, 
 
Figure 3–Distribution Square Distance Student from Schools. 
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understanding education as a complex system. It is necessary 
to rethink the approach to this research problem, introducing 
innovative methodologies that combine statistical elements, 
agent-based modeling and geographical information systems 
(GIS research should guarantee full confidentiality the 
personal data of individuals and families, according to the 
ethical principles of scientific research [117]). Therefore, to 
reformulate the research question, the following questions 
should be addressed: how socio-spatial structure affects the 
interaction between educational agents and, particularly, how 
it affects the competition between educational institutions? 
How they affect the real freedom of choice in socially 
interactive contexts? Due to the above, to what extent the 
spatial structure reduces the efficiency of the voucher 
system, in comparison to alternative systems? What would 
be the effects of changes in public policy, considering 
geographical condition and interaction networks? Therefore, 
future research should approach educational choice by 
means of agent-based modeling and simulation of the effect 
of the space-time structure on the choice of educational 
institutions by the families, in the context of a free choice 
system and State funding through vouchers. 
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X. APPENDIX 
 
i. Factor analysis of principal components: eigenvalues and total variance explained to derive six factors 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
3,863 19,314 19,314 3,863 19,314 
2,808 14,041 33,356 2,808 14,041 
2,042 10,208 43,563 2,042 10,208 
1,687 8,435 51,998 1,687 8,435 
1,146 5,731 57,729 1,146 5,731 
1,052 5,262 62,991 1,052 5,262 
,937 4,686 67,677 
  
,921 4,604 72,281 
  
,870 4,348 76,630 
  
,683 3,413 80,042 
  
,649 3,243 83,285 
  
,594 2,969 86,254 
  
,491 2,456 88,710 
  
,477 2,383 91,092 
  
,448 2,242 93,334 
  
,383 1,914 95,249 
  
,295 1,477 96,725 
  
,254 1,269 97,995 
  
,227 1,133 99,128 
  
,174 ,872 100,000 
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ii. Factor analysis of principal components: Rotated component matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component  
Desarroll
o 
comunal 
Capital 
económic
o y 
cultural 
Socializació
n secundaria 
Pode
r 
Servicios 
de salud y 
crecimiento 
habitaciona
l 
Desarraig
o 
Seguridad -,752 -,020 ,011 -,066 ,257 ,055 
Condiciones 
Educacionale
s Municipales 
,718 -,020 ,488 ,184 ,017 -,090 
Desarrollo 
empresarial ,633 ,189 -,176 ,251 ,163 ,097 
Espacio ,541 ,273 ,238 ,370 ,302 ,123 
Calidad de 
Salud -,510 ,395 ,088 ,160 ,393 ,279 
Finanzas 
Municipales ,483 -,104 ,393 -,170 ,206 -,078 
Propiedad de 
transporte ,084 ,800 ,032 ,252 ,042 ,115 
NSE ,049 ,766 ,018 -,159 ,018 -,054 
Calidad de 
Vivienda y 
Hogar 
-,179 ,704 -,003 -,328 -,093 -,097 
Nivel 
educativo ,283 ,627 ,063 ,447 ,133 ,046 
Acceso a 
informacion ,068 ,108 ,872 ,052 ,026 ,014 
Clima escolar -,153 -,120 ,791 -,021 -,196 -,059 
Calidad de 
empleo ,193 ,146 ,674 ,078 ,120 ,122 
Posicion 
Ocupacional ,036 ,070 ,023 ,749 -,061 ,029 
Inmovilidad 
diaria ,127 -,185 ,061 ,743 ,243 -,151 
Crecimiento 
de Vivienda ,089 -,013 ,069 ,085 ,854 -,123 
Salud 
municipal ,452 -,124 ,421 ,019 -,619 -,049 
Movilidad 
habitacional ,014 ,082 ,028 ,079 -,099 ,771 
Cultura civica ,131 ,081 -,015 ,342 -,095 -,412 
Etnia ,010 -,369 -,017 -,109 -,050 ,382 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
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iii Cluster analysis dendrogram 
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